





Reserve System. I especially appreciate assistance
provided by Kevin Kliesen, associate economist
in the Research Division of the St. Louis Fed.
However, I retain full responsibility for errors.
EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT
Over the past few weeks, government statisti-
cal agencies and private-sector organizations
have released several key economic reports.
Recent data pound home an important lesson.
High-frequency data, such as monthly reports,
tend to be variable and subject to revision. Before
last Friday’s employment report, the financial
press was full of articles on the prospects for a
soft patch in the economy. The large increase in
employment in April reported on Friday, and
upward revisions of employment data for
February and March, dispelled much of the soft-
patch talk. While I talk about recent data, how-
ever, keep in mind that, as one of my economist
friends put it, because of data revisions economic
history is never quite what she used to be.
To emphasize how important it is to examine
statistical reports closely, note that even revisions
must be examined closely. Consider the April
employment report. Seasonally adjusted employ-
ment for March was revised up by 93,000, a sig-
nificant number of jobs. But the seasonally
unadjusted count was revised up by only 50,000
jobs—still significant but many fewer than 93,000.
Thus, revision of seasonal factors accounted for
43,000 of the total revision of 93,000 in the sea-
sonally adjusted job count. Revisions of seasonal
factors are not fundamental, but merely change
I
am pleased to be here today to discuss
the economic outlook for the nation.
There are always issues of one sort or
another, and today is no different. Still,
although I’ll discuss these issues, it is worth
reminding ourselves just how sound the U.S.
economy is. In short, life is good for most
Americans and the nation has done a fine job in
seizing opportunities. The fact that we have
issues to discuss is a consequence of how ambi-
tious we are. We know that our nation always
has further opportunities to exploit, improve-
ments to make and problems to solve. My point
is simply that in discussing problems we not
lose sight of what we have and why we have it.
With regard to longer-run issues, perhaps
their key unifying feature is that they arise from
the changing demographic situation in the United
States and the rest of the world. Demands on
government from our aging population, centered
on, but not confined to, Social Security and
Medicare are at the top of the agenda. Although
not the whole story, these spending pressures
have much to do with the federal budget deficit
and prospects for future deficits. It would be easy
to expand the list of longer-run issues, but doing
so would make impossible a discussion of the
topic for today—the U.S. economic outlook over
the next few years.
The major issues in the economic outlook,
much in the news in recent weeks, concern
prospects for inflation and the possibility of a
slowdown in economic growth. I’ll take up the
growth situation first, and then turn to inflation.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federalhow employment gains are distributed across
the months of the year.
The lesson, by the way, is not that the data
are misleading but instead that they must be
interpreted with due regard to the statistical
processes behind their construction. Current
estimates published by the statistical agencies
represent the best estimates our first-class pro-
fessional statisticians can supply. Agency pub-
lications provide ample information on the
statistical properties of these estimates, and we
ignore those properties at our peril.
From a forecasting perspective, perhaps the
most important of the recent data releases was
indeed the employment report for April. Based
on this report—a total seasonally-adjusted jobs
gain of 274,000—it appears that economic con-
ditions improved dramatically in April. In addi-
tion, growth of aggregate hours was the strongest
in more than eight years, while average hourly
earnings advanced at almost a 4 percent rate.
Together, these numbers imply considerable
growth in personal income in April.
Other important reports released recently
include first-quarter estimates of real GDP, employ-
ment costs and productivity, or output per hour
of labor input. At the beginning of every month
the Institute for Supply Management (ISM)
releases its reports for manufacturing and non-
manufacturing, and so we now have those reports
for April. The ISM manufacturing report is a par-
ticularly valuable indicator of economic activity
in the manufacturing sector.
As measured by the ISM’s diffusion index,
the pace of manufacturing activity slowed a little
more than expected in April, as both the index
of new orders and order backlogs dipped and
firms reportedly pared their inventory stocks.
Of note, the ISM report ran a bit counter to the
tone of the latest Beige Book report, which noted
“largely positive” readings from most Districts,
and to a few other surveys of the manufacturing
sector released in April. Nonetheless, the Fed’s
monthly industrial production report for March
suggest that growth of manufacturing output has
retreated modestly, albeit from rather high rates
of growth. These readings on manufacturing are
consistent with the April jobs report, which
showed that manufacturing jobs actually declined
by 6,000 despite the strong overall jobs growth
of 274,000.
On the non-manufacturing side, the ISM’s
April business activity index also edged down
modestly from March’s level, but was slightly
stronger than expected. Moreover, the report
indicates continued strong growth in the services
sector of the economy, which is much larger than
the goods producing sectors.
The flood of news continued with this morn-
ing’s report on international trade in March, which
I’ve not yet had a chance to digest. Tomorrow
we’ll learn how sales at the nation’s retailers
fared in April. The retail sales report is followed
with great interest, but I always issue a word of
special warning on this report. The report that
will get all the attention is the Advance Report
on Retail Sales, which tends to be volatile and is
often revised substantially. Analysts should pay
almost as much attention to the revisions of prior
advance reports as they do to the initial estimate.
That said, indications are retail sales posted a
sizable gain in April—even when last month’s
impressive auto sales are excluded.
As many analysts have commented, some of
the latest data are suggestive of an economic soft
patch. I do not disagree with this interpretation,
but emphasize that there is so much noise in
monthly data that it is unwise to dramatically
alter economic forecasts for this year and next.
The latest Blue Chip forecast for 2005 is 3.4 per-
cent real growth, measured in terms of the entire
year compared to 2004, and also 3.3 percent
growth for 2006 compared to 2005. Admittedly,
these are modestly below last month’s Blue Chip
forecasts, which were for 3.7 and 3.4 percent for
2005 and 2006, respectively. These forecasts
probably reflect the weaker-than-expected first-
quarter GDP report, but I would not be at all sur-
prised if they were marked up in response to the
strong April jobs report. In any event, the forecasts
are below last year’s 4.4 percent growth, as should
be expected as the economy absorbs its margin
of underutilized labor and capital resources.
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measure of economic conditions is the nation’s
gross domestic product. A couple of weeks ago,
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) pegged
first-quarter real GDP growth at 3.1 percent, which
was about three-quarters of a percentage point
below both the April Blue Chip Consensus fore-
cast and the economy’s growth registered in the
fourth quarter of 2004. This first-quarter report
was the BEA’s “advance” estimate, which is based
on incomplete data. Among other items, the BEA
lacks solid estimates of exports, imports, and
business inventories for the last month of the
quarter when the advance estimate is released.
The BEA projects the missing data using past
data and some judgment.
As the missing source data trickle in, and the
existing source data get revised, the BEA will
revise its estimate of first-quarter real GDP; it
will publish the first revision, which it calls the
“preliminary” estimate on Thursday, May 26. I
have no reason to believe that the revision will
be either up or down.
The advance GDP report for the first quarter
had several key features. First, growth of consumer
expenditures remained fairly strong, though its
contribution to real GDP growth lagged a bit from
the previous quarter. For the most part, weaker
growth of consumer outlays reflected a sizable
decline in purchases of light trucks. In fact, out-
lays for new light trucks—a significant component
of which are SUVs—declined at a double-digit
rate for the second consecutive quarter. This
segment of the auto market has obviously been
adversely affected by higher gasoline prices.
However, domestic auto and light trucks sales
improved dramatically in April, and combined
were up a little more than 7 percent from two
months earlier; sales of foreign-produced light
vehicles were up a bit more, about 7.5 percent.
Dissecting the components of the report, the
largest single reason for slower GDP growth in the
first quarter was a slowdown in business expen-
ditures on equipment and software. Business
investment in structures also slowed. After grow-
ing at about a 13 percent rate over the final three
quarters of 2004, real business fixed investment
only increased at about a 5 percent rate in the first
quarter. Given that many forecasters continue to
expect relatively strong growth in business capital
for the remainder of 2005, and even into 2006, it
may be the case that some of the rapid growth of
business investment in 2004 reflected the efforts
of firms to take advantage of the business invest-
ment tax incentives that expired on the last day
of 2004. If so, then the first-quarter investment
lull may have merely reflected the fact that some
firms decided to move forward into 2004 some
of the capital expenditures that otherwise would
have occurred in early 2005.
Partially offsetting the capital-spending slow-
down in the first quarter was a modest increase
in the growth of housing construction. For some
time now, the resiliency of the U.S. housing
industry has surprised many in the forecasting
community. Indeed, March construction spending
rose by more than expected. Although housing
is susceptible to long-term demographic trends
such as a declining number of new household
family formations, for purposes of discussing
the short-term outlook movements in mortgage
interest rates and real household incomes matter
more for this segment of the economy. Accord-
ingly, as long as mortgage rates remain relatively
low and growth of real after-tax income remains
relatively strong, then housing should do fine.
Should either of these factors take a turn for the
worse, it would be natural to expect a different
outcome.
Finally, I should note that the growth of U.S.
exports to foreign residents rebounded rather
strongly in the first quarter, but that the pace of
spending by U.S. residents on foreign-produced
goods and services rose by even more. Because
the U.S. economy remains considerably stronger
than many of our trading partners, and the growth
differential will likely persist for the rest of this
year and into next year, foreign demand for U.S.-
produced goods and services will probably con-
tinue to lag U.S. demand for foreign products.
As long as the United States remains a good
place for foreigners to invest their excess saving,
one should not expect a significant realignment
between the growth of U.S. exports and imports.
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that characterized some of the previous readings.




Perpetuating one of last year’s most signifi-
cant developments, consumers and businesses
continue to face higher-than-expected prices of
crude oil and refined products this year. To put
some numbers into this discussion, I’ll concen-
trate on prices for West Texas Intermediate, the
benchmark grade of U.S. crude oil. At the end of
2004, the futures contract for delivery in December
2005 closed at a little under $42 per barrel, and
the spot price at about $43.50 per barrel. By early
April, futures prices had risen to a little less than
$59 per barrel while the spot price had risen to
more than $57 a barrel. Since then, spot prices
have fallen back to around $50 per barrel, but
futures prices have only dropped to around $53
per barrel. Although still high, it is useful to
remember that current prices would need to rise
to around $77 per barrel to reach their record
inflation-adjusted highs that were seen in early
1980.
Traditionally, large oil price increases have
principally reflected reductions, either actual or
expected, in supply as a consequence of oil embar-
goes and wars. However, a key feature of the cur-
rent episode is the prominence of demand-side
factors associated with an increased call on world
supplies by fast-growing economies like China
and India. Significant growth in the United States
has also boosted world energy demand.
Looking ahead, it is likely that demand-side
pressures will continue to be important. The
International Monetary Fund’s latest World
Economic Outlook projects that world oil demand
will increase by about 68 percent between 2004
and 2030. However, China’s projected demand is
expected to increase by more than 192 percent,
and its share of world consumption is projected
to nearly double to 13.5 percent. To meet this
increased worldwide demand, the IMF projects
that non-OPEC supply will increase by about 40
percent; to make up the difference, the IMF proj-
ects that OPEC production will have to rise by
about 112 percent.1 Already, OPEC is estimated
to be producing at about 95 percent capacity.
What this means, in short, is that new fields or
alternative sources of energy will need to be
found and developed, or enhanced conservation
measures will be required.
In a market-based economy like ours, the
pricing mechanism eventually allocates resources
to their most productive uses. Hence, higher oil
prices will stimulate both increased production
and active energy conservation measures, both of
which will tend to limit further price increases
and perhaps reduce prices over time. This process
is not something that usually occurs rapidly.
Longer-dated futures prices, such as the contract
for delivery of West Texas Intermediate in
December 2009, have risen from about $27.75
per barrel in early March 2004 to just under $48
per barrel currently. That fact suggests that many
market participants believe that higher oil prices
will be with us for some time.
High prices, however, should not be confused
with rising prices. Although there may be some
continuing pass-through of higher energy prices
into prices for other goods, energy itself should
not be a source of long-continuing inflation
pressure.
Should we be concerned about the economic
effects of higher energy prices? Over the near-
term, as last year showed, the increase in real oil
prices, which exceeded 25 percent, helped to pro-
duce higher inflation rates and modestly weaker
growth than would otherwise have occurred. If
this year’s unexpected increase in oil prices per-
sists, then it would be reasonable to expect a drag
on the growth of real incomes, and thus output,
1 International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook, April 2005, Table 4.5. Supply projections are mid-point estimates between upper-
and lower-bound projections for non-OPEC supply and Call on OPEC.
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4and higher inflation relative to what was origi-
nally expected.
The National Association for Business
Economics recently asked its panel of industry
economists to estimate the effect on their esti-
mates for real GDP growth and CPI inflation for
2005 if West Texas Intermediate ends the year at
$56 per barrel, which is where the December 2005
futures price was in early April. Most of the pan-
elists reported that the most likely outcome would
be for real GDP growth to be reduced by between
0.2 and 0.6 percentage points, and for CPI inflation
to rise by between 0.2 and 0.6 percentage points.
These estimates give the sense that energy prices
are significant for the U.S. economy, but not so
significant as to change the outlook in any fun-
damental way.
If the effects of energy prices today seem rel-
atively small, it is useful to understand that the
magnitude of today’s increases would have prob-
ably produced much larger effects if we were
using technologies and economic production
processes from the 1970s. Technological improve-
ments, which have made our economy much
more energy efficient, and improvements in our
regulatory structure, which have allowed the
price mechanism to work more freely, mean that
today’s economy can endure periods of sharply
higher energy prices with less damage than in
earlier periods. U.S. energy demand per dollar of
real GDP has declined by about 21 percent since
1990, and by about 38 percent since 1980. Thus,
while higher oil prices do have adverse effects,
we should not underestimate the capacity of the
U.S. economy to adjust to those higher prices. Our
economy’s solid performance during the period
of rising oil prices over the past four years is a
testament to its resilience.
In few areas is this resiliency more evident
than in the nation’s labor productivity growth,
which has averaged a shade over 3 percent per
year since 1996. In the first quarter of this year,
output per hour in the nonfarm business sector
rose at a 2.6 percent annual rate after rising at
about a 1.75 percent annual rate over the second
half of 2004. For quite some time, the FOMC has
regularly commented on the “ongoing support
to economic activity” from “robust underlying
growth in productivity.” Should this support
begin to erode—and there appears to be little
evidence that it has—one of the consequences
would be an elevated risk of higher inflation.
Labor costs depend on wages and productivity.
Labor costs have been increasing only modestly,
because productivity increases have been almost
as large as wage increases. If productivity growth
falters, labor costs will increase more rapidly
and, at some point, firms will attempt to recoup
some of these costs in the form of higher product
prices. Although unit labor costs edged modestly
higher over the second half of 2004, growing at a
3 percent rate, their rate of gain in the first quarter
of 2005 slowed to about a 2¼ rate. Even though
costs have drifted modestly higher over the past
year relative to a few years earlier, as best we can
judge forecasters do not envision a sustained
upturn that would grab the Fed’s attention. If
anything, as the modest first-quarter gains in the
employment cost index showed, the threat level
is not terribly high, though it is obviously impor-




In thinking about the outlook over the next
couple of years, policymakers will be paying
especially close attention to three unfolding
developments. First, inflation pressures may
continue to intensify, particularly for prices of
non-energy and non-food items. The FOMC will
have to sort out whether the data indicate that
more rapid price increases are a temporary blip
on an otherwise steady long-term outlook or an
indication of a more fundamental inflation prob-
lem. Second, the FOMC will be following incom-
ing data closely to determine whether the recent
moderation in economic growth is likely to per-
sist into the summer and beyond. Finally, at what
point will we perceive that FOMC policy actions
have been sufficient to maintain long-run price
stability?
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output and inflation projections that the FOMC
presented to Congress in February. The central
tendency of the Board of Governors and Reserve
Bank presidents was that real GDP would increase
by between 3¾ and 4 percent this year, and that
core PCE inflation was most likely to come in at
1½ to 1¾ percent. As the April employment
report vividly showed, the data can sometimes
turn on a dime. When we put all the recent data
together, we get a mixed picture that does not
require a fundamental change to the outlook.
Nevertheless, we should not forget the usual
forecast errors. Given the unpredictable things
that can happen, a point forecast of 3¾ percent
real growth over the four quarters of 2005 should
really be expressed as a growth rate of 3¾ plus
or minus 1¼ percent.2
The Federal Reserve’s strategy for encourag-
ing maximum sustainable economic growth
depends on maintaining price stability. Fore-
casters were surprised by the pickup in inflation
last year: The consumer price index (CPI), the
best known measure of consumer prices, rose by
3½ percent over the twelve months of 2004,
which was about 1½ percentage points higher
than forecasters had expected. Much of this fore-
cast error was due to unexpectedly higher energy
prices. Still, when we strip out food and energy
prices, we find that “core inflation” rose to about
2¼ percent on a CPI basis.
The Fed’s preferred measure of prices is the
price index used to deflate personal consumption
expenditures (PCE) in the national income and
product accounts, less food and energy prices.
One area of concern is that core PCE prices have
risen rather rapidly thus far in 2005; they are up
at almost a 3 percent annual rate for the three
months ending in March, compared to the 1½
percent gain seen for all of 2004. As yet, though,
nominal interest rates have not moved in a man-
ner that would suggest the market is beginning
to price-in a larger inflation premium. If anything,
yields on 10-year Treasury securities suggest just
the opposite because they are not only little
changed since the first of the year but also still
below last June’s level when the FOMC began its
policy of bringing the federal funds target rate
toward an equilibrium level. To me, that suggests
that the market is confident of the FOMC’s resolve
to keep inflation well-controlled. This view is
generally confirmed by the financial market’s
view of long-term inflation expectations over a
period of 5 to 10 years as registered in the yield
spread between conventional and inflation-
protected Treasury securities.
The FOMC has emphasized that it is prepared,
if necessary, to move more aggressively to pro-
tect the relatively low rate of core inflation that
now exists. Nevertheless, the FOMC’s best judg-
ment at this time is that the target federal funds
rate can continue to rise at a measured pace and
that this policy will maintain economic growth
without rising inflation.
I’ve emphasized on any number of occasions
my view that today’s expected policy path ought
to be considered tentative. The expected path is
based on the FOMC’s best judgment from data
currently in hand. If there are surprises in newly
arriving data that require a major revision to the
outlook, with regard to either GDP growth or
inflation, then the FOMC will revise its expected
policy path.
The only important surprise I’ve seen in the
past year is that there has not been a major surprise
in the economic data, except for energy prices.
This stability in the economy is reflected in the
stability of economic forecasts. In January 2004,
the Blue Chip consensus forecast for 2005 was
for real GDP to grow at a 3.7 percent rate. Month
by month since January 2004 the Blue Chip con-
sensus for 2005 growth has been remarkably
constant, ranging between a low of 3.4 percent
this month and a high of 3.8 in several months,
most recently July 2004. Indeed, the consensus
was 3.7 percent last month.
The Blue Chip consensus inflation forecast
for 2005, as measured by the total CPI, has
2 Gavin, William T. and Mandal, Rachel J. “Evaluating FOMC Forecasts.” International Journal of Forecasting, October-December, 2003, 19,
pp. 655-67.
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6changed more, from 2.1 percent in January 2004
to 2.8 percent this month. Much of that increase
reflects energy price increases that were not fore-
seen. Over the past 12 months, the total CPI has
risen by 0.8 percentage points faster than the
core CPI.
Looking ahead, I’m optimistic about the infla-
tion situation. Wage inflation remains modest.
Productivity growth remains good. The pricing
environment remains quite competitive, which
means that firms cannot readily expand profit
margins. Should any of these factors change
adversely—wages rise more rapidly, productivity
rise more slowly, and/or profit margins expand—
then inflation risks will rise. Although I believe
that inflation risks are tilted to the upside, I do
not believe that the probabilities are high enough
to justify concern at this time. My optimism also
reflects the fact that money growth—the fuel for
long-run inflation—remains quite low and has
in fact declined over the past 6 months.
At some point we’ll almost certainly see
some surprises in the data. What should not be
uncertain, however, is the Fed’s iron-clad com-
mitment to maintaining price stability. Main-
taining fundamental price stability is central to
maximizing sustainable economic growth and
the economy’s ability to adjust successfully to
inevitable shocks. That has been the Fed’s mes-
sage for many years, and its guide to its own pol-
icy actions. When a strategy has succeeded so
well, why change it?
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